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COMMmS1
HOPE FOR THE FUNCTIONALLY POLITICALLY IMPOTENT
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE-A HATCH ACT REAPPRAISAL
The idea of a more or less politically neutral government bureau-
cracy was probably first espoused in Plato's Republic. Plato envisioned
that his rulers and administrators would live in Spartan simplicity and
govern for the good of the Commonwealth, and that the absence of
private property would remove the temptation for the rulers to sacrifice
the welfare of the state to purely personal interests. A bureaucracy
which is denied economic power thus has no interest in influencing
others for personal advantage.'
Although Plato's solution seems somewhat extreme, it nevertheless
indicates early recognition of the problem of the inconsistent roles of
citizen and civil servant. The problem is succinctly enunciated in an
official British Government Report as being a conflict between the
desirability that all citizens have the opportunity to take an active role
in political life, and the public interest need for the maintenance of
"political impartiality" in the civil service.2 These two objectives have
proved to be very nearly mutually exclusive, and the pursuit of one
makes the other much more difficult to achieve.
In the United States, the principles in contention seem to be "those
which are clearly outlined in the first amendment against those which
are inherent in an impartial civil service 3 The question is how to
make the rights of citizens and civil servants commensurate. 4 The
problem is clear whereas the solution remains clouded in obscurity.
There have been many attempts to regulate political activity among
federal employees.5 However, the Hatch Act8 was the first compre-
hensive statutory scheme enacted by Congress to deal with the prob-
lem, and today, along with comparable state laws, it effectively limits
1 PLATo, THE REPuBLic ch. 10, at 102 at seq. (F.M. Comford transl., Oxford
19451 REPOnT oN =nE POLITICAL ACTIVITIEs OF CrvIm SRVANTs, 12 REPORTS FROM
CONUSSIONES INSPECTORS, AN OTHERS, Cmd. No. 7718, at 18 (1949), cited in
Note, The HatcA Act-Political Immaturity, 45 GEO. L.J. 233, 234 (1956).
3 Jones, Reevaluating the Hatch Act, 29 PuB. AD. REV. 249, 250 (1969) [here-inafter cited as Jones], reporting the work of the Commission of Political Activity
of Government Personnel.
4 Rosenbloom, The Constitution and the Civil Service, 18 KAN. L. REv. 839(1970).
5 See Buckley Political Rights of the Hatch Act-A Reappraisal, 60 YALE L.J.986 (1951); Friedman & Klinger, The Hatch Act: Regulation by Administrative
Action of Political Activities of Government Employees, 7 FED. B.J. 5 (1945);
Heady, The Hatch Act Decisions, 41 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 687 (1947); Howard,
Federal Restrictions upon Political Activity of Government Employees, 35 AM. POL.
Scr. REv. 470 (1941); Kaplan, Political Neutrality of the Civil Service, 1 PuB.
PERSONNEL REv. 10 (April 1940); Note, The Hatch Act-Political Immaturity, 45
GEo. L.J. 233, 234 (1956).
65 U.S.C. § 7324 (1970).
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the political activity of over 12 million public employees.7 The funda-
mental policy embodied in the Hatch Act is that government em-
ployees may not use official authority for political influence or become
actively involved in "political management or in political campaigns,"
which is defined to mean the acts prohibited by the Civil Service Com-
mission rules prior to July 19, 1940.8 The Act does, however, make it
clear that the employee's right to vote as he wishes and to express his
opinion on political matters and candidates shall not be abridged;9 and
certain employees at the policy-making level are excluded from the
prohibitions of the section.' 0 The important components to note are the
comprehensiveness of the Act and the attempted definition of "an active
part in political management or in political campaigns" through prior
rulings of the Civil Service Commission.' Under the Hatch Act and
Rule IV of the United States Civil Service Commission, a federal em-
ployee may not: 1) campaign for a political party or candidate; 2)
transport voters other than members of his family to the polls; 3)
distribute campaign material; 4) march in a political parade; 5) pro-
mote political dinners; 6) take an active part in conventions; 7) initiate
petitions or solicit signatures for petitions on behalf of a partisan
candidate; 8) distribute campaign literature, badges, or buttons; 9) be
connected editorially or managerially with any newspaper generally
known as partisan; or 10) be a candidate for nomination or election to
a national, state, county, or municipal office.12
These prohibitions are seemingly so comprehensive that it is easier
to designate the political activity not proscribed by the Act. Govern-
ment employees may vote, reveal opinions not designed to influence
the outcome of a political campaign, wear badges while not at work,
publicly express opinions on political subjects not directly related to
political campaigns, and sign petitions.13 The scope of the restrictions
placed on the political activity of government employees has been
strongly attacked by many commentators; it has been argued that the
Hatch Act deprives government employees of their rights and fore-
7 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COzmsCE, STATISTICAL ABSMACr
OF THE UNTED STATES 221 (92d ed. 1971). The total number employed by gov-
ernmental units is 12,597,000. The federal government employs 2,705,000 (ex-
cluding those serving in the military), while state and local governments employ
9,891,000.
85 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (1970).
9Id. at (b).
'oId. at (d).
11 See also 54 Stat. 747, 771 (1940) (Section 15 of Hatch Acts).
12 Federal Personnel Manual of the United States Civil Service Commission,
ch. 733 (1965). See also 1 U.S. Civ. SEa. Cozja'N AcTvrry REP. (1971), for
examples of specific acts deemed to be political activity in violation of 5 U.S.C. §
7324 (1970).13 Note, The Hatch Act-Political Immaturity, 45 GEO. LJ. 233, 238 (1956).
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closes their ability to take action to protect what rights they do have.' 4
It is generally accepted that the Act makes civil servants nearly im-
potent politically, since their freedom to speak out on public issues
is so severely circumscribed. Mr. Justice Black trenchantly stated in
regard to the Act that:
They [public employees] may vote in silence; they may carefully
and quietly express a political view at their peril; and they may
become "spectators" [this is the Commission's word] at campaign
gatherings, though it may be highly dangerous for them to "second
a motion" or let it be known that they agree or disagree with a
speaker.' 5
It has been further pointed out that aside from the damage to indi-
vidual rights, such restrictions actually tend to dilute the quality of
federal service because the restrictions create conditions which might
be repugnant to many qualified persons. 16
The Hatch Act has also been criticized for overbreadth, ambiguity,
and uncertainty. The recent Commission of Political Activity of Gov-
ernment Personnel has concluded that the Hatch Act is "confusing,
ambiguous, restrictive, negative in character, and possibly unconstitu-
tional."17 The Commission further decided that the only activity which
should be limited is that which could "threaten the integrity, efficiency,
and impartiality of public service."' 8 rather than the all-inclusive ap-
proach attempted in the Hatch Act. Moreover, the constitutionality
of the Hatch Act has been seriously questioned because of lack of a
compelling governmental interest and lack of specificity of restric-
tions.19
Regulations restricting political activities of public employees were
formerly rationalized under the so-called doctrine of privilege; public
employment could not be demanded as a right. Therefore, when the
citizen accepted public employment he thereby voluntarily accepted
as well the concomitant conditions, and although the conditions of
employment may have interfered with his constitutional rights, those
rights were not violated because the restrictions [the interferences
with his constitutional rights] were voluntarily accepted.2 0 The doc-
'4 Wormuth, The Hatch Act Cases, 1 WEsT POL. Q. 165 (1948).
15 United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 108-09 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting).16 Esman, The Hatch Act-A Reappraisal, 60 YALE L.J. 986, 998 (1951).
'7 Jones, supra note 3. See also Rose, A Critical Look at the Hatch Act, 75
HArtv. L. REv. 510, 526 (1962).
18 Jones, supra note 3, at 253.
19 Note, The Public Employee and Political Activity, 3 SUFFOLx U.L. REv. 380(1969).
20 Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 840.
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trine is exemplified by Justice Holmes' often quoted statement that
"petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman."21
This doctrine has been replaced in recent years by the doctrine of
substantial interest; which simply stipulates that there are certain
substantive rights which may not be abridged without a showing of
actual necessity.22 This doctrine, in contrast to the doctrine of privilege,
brings the rights of the civil servant closer to those of the citizen in
general.23 United States v. Lovett 24 indicated the degree to which the
doctrine of privilege had been eroded when the Supreme Court in-
dicated that while there may be no constitutional right to public em-
ployment, no one may be prevented from engaging in such employment
by the government without a judicial trial.25
The Hatch Act received its principal constitutional construction in
United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell.26 In this landmark
case, the Supreme Court considered an action to enjoin the enforcement
of the Hatch Act proscription of actively working in a partisan political
campaign and to cause the section of the Act to be declared uncon-
stitutional.2 7 In a 4-8 decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Act's prohibition of political activity as to the particular plaintiff.
Mr. Justice Reed's majority opinion holds that
... Congress may regulate the political conduct of government
employees "within reasonable limits;" even though the regulation
trenches to some extent upon unfettered political action. The
determination of the extent to which political activities of govern-
mental employees shall be regulated lies primarily with Congress.
Courts will interfere only when such regulation passes beyond the
general existing conception of governmental power.28
21 McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892). See also Dotson,
The Emerging Doctrine of Privilege in Public Employment, 16 PUB. AD. BEv. 77
(1955).22 Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 840. See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARtv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).2 3 Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 840.
24 378 U.S. 303 (1946).
25 See Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 841. See also Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 374 (1967). ..... [Tlhis Court has now rejected the concept that con-
stitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a
'right or as a 'privilege'.'
26330 U.S. 75 (1947).
27 The petitioner, Mr. Poole, was an employee at the U.S. Mint in Philadel-
phia, and was a civil service employee subject to the restrictions of the Hatch Act.
In addition, Mr. Poole was a Ward Executive Committeeman for the Democratic
Party. He worked at the polls and paid party workers for their services on election
day. After being dismissed for acts in contravention of section 9(2) of the Hatch
Act, he brought an action contesting the dismissal on the ground that the first
amendment guaranteed that the people, including public employees, could exercise
these political rights. Id. at 83, 91 n.23, 92 n.24.
28 Id. at 102.
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However, the Court in Mitchell apparently did not trouble itself to
define the "reasonable limits" beyond which Congress may not regulate
political activity of public employees; that is, the appropriate scope
of the Hatch Act itself wasn't determined except by implication. The
Court, rather, narrowed its consideration to the facts of the case
before it. The decision seems to ignore the realism of the broad ap-
plication of the restrictions in favor of the illusory situation and seeming
inconsequence of the single isolated instance.
The dissent in Mitchell, however, presented a more reasonable and
realistic approach. Mr. Justice Black pointed out that public employees
are at their peril in expressing political opinions because of the
vagueness of the rules. 29 He applied the standard criteria that laws
restricting first amendment rights should be "... narrowly drawn to
meet the evil aimed at and to affect only the minimum number of
people imperatively necessary to prevent a grave and imminent danger
to the public."3 Applying this test, Justice Black concluded ". ..
[t]hat the provision here attacked is too broad, ambiguous, and uncer-
tain in its consequences to be made the basis of removing deserving
employees from their jobs."3'
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in part, remarked that if the
petitioner had been an administrative worker, perhaps the Hatch Act
could have been sustained as to him. However, since he was so remote
from policy-making or contact with the public, such restrictions
were unnecessary in this particular case, i.e., the restrictions here
considered were unnecessarily inclusive. He agreed with the basic
purpose of the Hatch Act-to provide a competent bureaucracy to
serve whatever administration is in power. But he also indicated that
29 Id. at 108 (Black, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 110 (Black, J., dissenting).
31 Id.
The right to vote and privately to express an opion on political matters,
important though they be, are but parts of the broad freedoms which our
Constitution has provided as the bulwarks of our free political institutions.
Popular government, to be effective, must permit and encourage political
activity by all the people .... Legislation which muzzles several million
citizens threatens popular government not only because it injures the
individuals muzzled but also because of its harmful effect on the body
politic in depriving it of the political participation and interest of such a
arge segment of our citizens. . . . I think the Constitution prohibits
legislation which prevents millions of citizens from contributing their
arguments, complaints and suggestions to thepolitical debates which are
the essence of our democracy; prevents them from engaging in organized
activity to urge others to vote, and take an interest in political affairs;
bars them from performing the interested citizen's duty of insuring that
his and his fellow citizens' votes are counted. Such drastic limitations on
the right of all the people to express political opinions and take political
action would be inconsistent with the First Amendment's guaranty of
freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition. Id. at 110-11.
1973] 1023
12KNcKY LAw JouRNAL
the Act is too broad, stating that "specific evils ...require specific
treatment"3 2 and noted that Cantwell v. Connecticut33 requires that
statutes be narrowly drawn where constitutional rights are abridged.3 4
Although Mitchell has never been expressly overruled, its con-
tinued vitality is extremely doubtful in light of subsequent decisions
of the Supreme Court,33 raising the possibility that it has been over-
ruled by implication. Shapiro v. Thompson36 held that the equal
protection clause required proof of a compelling governmental interest
when a classification, even though it has a reasonable basis, penalizes
the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right. In Mitchell there
was no showing of such a compelling governmental interest that would
justify the limitation on the political rights of government employees
resulting from the Hatch Act.
Perhaps more germane are the doctrines of overbreadth and vague-
ness. The concept of the overbreadth doctrine is that if the impact of
a statute is to deter the exercise (or place a penalty on the exercise) of
rights substantially protected by the Constitution, even if the statute is
regulating conduct which is the legitimate subject matter of regulation,
then the statute reaches that over which the government does not have
the power to regulate and is void. Stated differently, if the statute has
a "chilling effect" on the exercise of constitutionally protected rights,
it is void for overbreadth.37 The void for vagueness doctrine, on the
other hand, is basically a due process concept. Fundamental fairness
requires that one cannot be expected to conform to a law which gives
no objectively determinable standard of conduct. If reasonable men
cannot distinguish what is or is not required under the statute, it is
invalid because of vagueness.38 A law with no objectively determinable
standard of conduct fails to put one on notice of what is required or
prohibited and gives rise to the danger that those who apply the law
may end up writing the law arbitrarily when they determine what the
law is (i.e., an usurpation of the legislative function).
32 Id. at 123 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
33310 U.S. 296 (1940).
34 330 U.S. at 124 (Douglas, J., dissenting). "Those rights are too basic and
fundamental in our democratic political society to be sacrificed or ,ualified for
anything short of a clear and present danger to the civil service system.' Id. at 126.
35 Bruff, Unconstitutional Conditions on Public Employment, 21 HAsmros L.J.
129, 157 (1969); Note, The Supreme Court 1966 Term, 81 HtAv. L. RBv. 69, 170(1967); Note, Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842, 861
(1969).
36394 U.S. 618 (1969).
37 See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Cantvell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).3 8 See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Cantvell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,39 the Court invalidated certain
statutes and administrative rules utilized by the state of New York to
prevent employment of "subversives" in public schools. The regulations
and statutes provided that if a teacher was guilty of treasonable or
seditious words or acts, or advocated the overthrow of the government
by force, violence, or unlawful means, or published any document
urging unlawful overthrow of the government while embracing such
doctrine, or joined any group advocating such overthrow, the teacher
would be summarily discharged. 40 These provisions were invalidated
because of vagueness and overbreadth. The Supreme Court empha-
sized that first amendment political rights may not be lightly tampered
with.
[P]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so
closely touching our most precious freedoms . . . [f]or standards
of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free ex-
pression .... Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing
space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with
narrow specificity. . . . When one must guess what conduct or
utterance may lose him his position, one necessarily will "steer far
wider of the unlawful zone .. " For the "threat of sanctions may
deter... almost as potently as the actual application of sanctionsl"
S.. The danger of that chilling effect upon the exercise of vital
First Amendment rights must be guarded against by sensitive tools
which clearly inform teachers what is being proscribed. 41
In Pickering v. Board of Education,42 the Court held that the re-
moval of a teacher for publishing a letter in a local newspaper which
was critical of the Board of Education violated the teacher's first
amendment rights. The state had failed to show "specific incom-
patibility" between the role of a teacher and that of a citizen exercising
first amendment rights of free expression. 43
Even in light of some apparent erosion of the Mitchell rationale,
most federal court decisions regarding the Hatch Act or Hatch Act-
type state legislation have expressed "... . methodical adherence to the
spirit of the Hatch Act as discussed in Mitchell, and have consistently
supported Civil Service Commission actions under color of the Hatch
Act... .,44 Furthermore, few of the federal decisions have concerned
39 885 U.S. 589 (1967).
40 Id. at 589.
41 Id. at 603-04.
42 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Id. at 570. See also Taylor v. New York Transit Authority, 433 F.2d 665(2d Cir. 1970). Other cases with similar rationale include United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258 (1967); and Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).44 Shartsis, The Federal Hatch Act and Related State Court Trends-A Timefor Change?, 25 Bus. LAw. 1381, 1384 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Shartsis].
1973] COM' NTS 102,5
KENcKY LAw JouxmNAL
themselves with the appropriate scope of Hatch Act prohibitions but
rather turn on whether or not a certain political act of the employee
was within the scope of the Hatch Act, which is the Mitchell approach.
The typical federal court attitude is exhibited in Wisconsin State Em-
ployees Association v. Wisconsin Natural Resources Board,45 holding,
on the rationale of Mitchell, that a state could constitutionally require
that state employees relinquish the right to run for partisan political
office as a condition of public employment.46 Although acknowledging
decisions to the contrary, the District Court for the Western District
of Wisconsin stated that Mitchell had not been eroded and that the
Mitchell decision had never been questioned by a federal court.47
Gray v. Macy48 indicated that Mitchell was in point regarding the
discharge of a public employee by the Civil Service Commission for
partisan political activities.49
Other federal courts, although in the minority, have not been quite
so dogmatic in their adherence to the Mitchell reasoning. A crack in
the seemingly solid facade appeared in Wilson v. United States Civil
Service Commission,50 in which the D.C. District Court held that the
fact that a government employee published an unsolicited letter in a
newspaper recommending the defeat of certain partisan candidates
for state office did not show a violation of the Hatch Act prohibition
of government employees' active participation in political activities,
in the absence of a showing that the employee was effectively engaging
or participating in a political campaign.51 In Meehan v. Macy,52 al-
though the removal of a member of the police force of the Canal Zone
for publishing material called "contemptuous," "intemperate," and
"defamatory"53 was upheld, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ac-
knowledged that unless there was a showing that the exercise of a
constitutional right was inconsistent with the public status of the
employee, the limitation could not stand, and "... in some aspects, at
45 298 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Wisc. 1969).
46 Id. at 348-50.
47 Id. at 850.
48 239 F. Supp. 638 (D. Ore. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 358 F.2d 742
(9th Cir. 1966).
49 See also Northern Virginia Regional Park Authority v. United States Civil
Ser. Comm'n, 437 F.2d 1846 (4th Cir. 1971), upholding validity of Mitchell
since it has not been expressly overruled (collecting cases); Kearney v. Macy, 409
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 897 U.S. 948 (1970), stating that Mitchell
has not been overruled expressly or impliedly by subsequent decisions of the
Supreme Court; Broadrick v. Oklahoma ex t. Oklahoma State Personnel Bd.,
338 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
50 136 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1955).
51 Id. at 106.
52 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968), modified, 425 F.2d 469, aff'd, 425 F.2d 472
(1969).
53 id. at 833.
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least, [his] constitutional rights are inviolable notwithstanding [his]
status as a government employee." 4
Hobbs v. Thompson55 represents the first federal case to expressly
acknowledge that Mitchell has been eroded. The case involved a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of a city charter and ordinance restricting
electioneering activities of firemen.56 The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the challenged enactments were overly broad and
vague, and therefore unconstitutional. 57 The most significant part of
the decision was the recognition that the Mitchell rationale upholding
a "broad prophylactic rule against political activity" was no longer
vital law in light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions. 58 In the
recent decision of Mancuso v. Taft,59 the United States District Court
for Rhode Island granted a summary judgment to a police officer who
became a candidate for state representative in violation of the city
charter and enjoined city officials from removing him from his position,
declaring the charter provisions unconstitutional on grounds of vague-
ness and overbreadth, because the restriction was not limited to parti-
san political activity.60 The court, citing Hobbs, stated that although
Mitchell had not been expressly overruled, subsequent decisions had
vitiated its vitality.6 '
State courts have generally not been so reluctant to challenge the
54 Id. at 832.
55448 F.2d 456 (Sth Cir. 1971).56 Section 79, Rule 2, of the Macon City Charter, and Section 2-127 of the
city municipal ordinances provide that no employee of the city fire department:
shall take an active part in any primary or election, and all [such] em-
ployees are hereby prohibited from contributing any money to any candi-
date, soliciting votes, or prominently identifying themselves in a political
race with or against any candidate for office.
Id. at 457. In this instance, the firemen were protesting a directive ordering them
to remove political bumper stickers from their automobiles.
57 Id. at 471.
58 Id. at 472.
59 341 F. Supp. 574 (D.R.I. 1972).(0 Id. at 582. The relevant provisions of the City of Cranston Home Rule
Charter 1409 read:
The following practices are prohibited.
c. Continuing in the classified service after becoming a candidate for
nomination or election to any public office.... f. Making directly or in-
directly . . . any contribution to the campaign funds of any political
organization or candidate to public office or taking any part in the
management of any political organization or in the conduct of any political
campaign further than in the exercise of the rights of a citizen to express
his opinion and to cast his vote.
Any officer or employee of the city wilfully violating any of the provisions
of this section shall be removed from such office or employment.
Id. at 575.
01 Id. at 582, citing Pickering v. Board of Educ 391 US. 563 (1968);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Keyis~iian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); and United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
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Mitchell rationale.62 California has three major decisions limiting the
broad scope of Hatch Act-type legislation. In Fort v. Civil Service
Commission of the County of Alameda,63 the California Supreme Court
invalidated a section of a county charter 4 because the restrictive pro-
vision was not drawn narrowly enough to deal specifically with enu-
merated abuses.65 The charter was examined to determine whether
the restriction was valid as constituted, or whether in application it
was so broad that it produced needless strictures on constitutional
rights. The criteria the court developed for judging Hatch Act-type
cases was that "[iut must appear that restrictions imposed by a gov-
ernmental entity are not broader than are required to preserve the
efficiency and integrity of its public service."60 In this case, it was
determined that "... . in light of the principles applicable to freedom
of speech and the related First Amendment rights, no sound basis
has been shown for upholding a county provision having the breadth
of the one before us."67
In Kinnear v. City and County of San Francisco,8 a companion
case to Fort, the California Supreme Court applied the Fort test in
invalidating a section of the San Francisco Charter.0 9 The court held
the section void, on a Shapiro-type rationale, because San Francisco
had not "shown a compelling need to restrict the fundamental rights
involved on such a sweeping scale."70
Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District71 illustrates the
California method of determining the appropriate scope of the restric-
tion of political activity. In this case, a nurse had participated in a
62Shartsis, supra note 44, at 1387. ". . . [Tihese state court decisions offer
one interpretation of the erosion which has occurred beneath Mitchell..
63 38 Cal. Rptr. 625, 392 P.2d 385 (1964).
64 The relevant position of the regulation is § 41 of the Charter of Alameda
County:
No person holding a position in the classified civil service shall take any
part in political management or affairs in any political campaign or elec-
tion, or in any campaign to adopt or reject any initiative or referendum
measure other than to cast his vote or to privately express his opinion.
Any employee violating the provisions of this section may be removed
from office.
Id. at 626, 392 P.2d at 386.
65 Id. at 629, 392 P.2d at 389.
6O Id.
67 Id.
6 88 Cal. Rptr. 631, 392 P.2d 391 (1964).
69 Section 5 of the San Francisco Charter provides:
Any appointive officer or employee of the city and county who shall be-
come a candidate for election by the people to any public office shall
automatically forfeit any such city and county office or position.
Id. at 631, 392 P.2d at 392.
70 Id. at 632, 392 P.2d at 392.
7155 Cal. Rptr. 401, 421 P.2d 409 (1966).
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campaign to recall an officer in the hospital district in which she
worked, in violation of a Hospital District rule promulgated in a
memorandum. The court expanded the Fort test to compel the legis-
lative body to show that
[t]he utility of imposing conditions must manifestly outweigh any
resulting impairment of constitutional rights. Furthermore, in im-
posing conditions upon the enjoyment of publicly-conferred bene-
fits, as in the restriction of constitutional rights by more direct
means, the state must establish the unavailability of less offensive
alternatives and demonstrate that the conditions are drawn with
narrow specificity, restricting the exercise of constitutional rights
only to the extent necessary to maintain the integrity of the program
which confers the benefits.72
Here, the conclusion was reached that the activity in question could
possibly be prohibited, but since the limitations were so broad and
could embrace other matters which could not constitutionally be
proscribed, and since the limitations were not drawn to meet the
specifie act in question, the limitations were invalid for overbreadth. 73
These California cases shifted the burden to the government to justify
the need to restrict political activity by the public employee and ex-
panded the scope of judicial consideration beyond the narrow facts-of-
the-case view taken by most federal courts.
Other state decisions have followed similar routes in invalidating
legislation restricting the political activity of public employees. The
Oregon Supreme Court, in Minielly v. State,74 voided a state civil
service regulation requiring resignation from public employment upon
candidacy for popular office. The opinion noted that the Mitchell-type
rationale had been eroded by intervening decisions of the Supreme
Court and that "a revolution has occurred in the law relative to the
state's power to limit federal First Amendment rights."75 Here, the
view was taken that the state must show a compelling interest in order
to restrict any first amendment rights.76 In DeStafano v. Wilson7 7 a
72Id. at 407, 421 P.2d at 415.
73 Id. at 408, 421 P.2d at 415. This reasoning also seems analogous to the
doctrine of least drastic restraint. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (Brennan, J., concurring).
74411 P.2d 77 (Ore. 1966). The relevant regulation is ORE. REv. STAT. §
241.520, providing that
•..jN]o person employed under civil service.., of any county... shall
be a candidate for popular election to any public office, unless such
person immediately resigns from the position which he then holds under
civil service.
75411 P.2d 77, 77 (Ore. 1966).
76Id. at 83. See Shapiro v. Thompson 396 U.S. 618 (1969), and text ac-
companying note 36 supra.
77233 A.2d 682 (N.J. 1967).
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municipal fire department rule 7s restricting political activity was
struck down, consistent with the Fort rationale, because it was not
drawn with the requisite degree of specificity.79
These cases which have considered subsequent Supreme Court de-
cisions regarding the restriction of first amendment rights in con-
struing limitations on the political activity of public employees are
more or less analogous to the reasoning of Mr. Justice Black's dissent
in Mitchell. Aside from presenting a more realistic appraisal of the
relationship of the public employee to the government this position
strikes a more equitable balance between the conflicting goals of a
politically neutral civil bureaucracy and the widest possible partici-
pation in democratic institutions. Very recently, another federal court
has escaped from the dated doctrinal confines of Mitchell. In National
Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. United States Civil Ser-
vice Commission,80 a three-judge federal panel, in a 2-1 decision,
held that the federal Hatch Act's proscription against federal em-
ployees engaging in political activities is unconstitutionally vague and
overly broad, and that it chills first amendment rights.8 ' Although two
previous federal courts have rejected the Mitchell rationale, 2 this
decision marks the first time a federal court has done so when con-
sidering a challenge to the Hatch Act, and the first time a federal
court has failed to uphold the Hatch Act by expressly declaring it un-
constitutional.
The Letter Carriers case involved a class action on behalf of all
federal employees seeking a declaratory judgment that the Hatch Act
provision prohibiting most federal employees from taking "an active
part in political management or in political campaigns" is unconstitu-
tional. Judge Parker, although concurring, reserved the right to file
a separate opinion. 3
In his opinion, Judge Gesell pointed out that, although Mitchell
focused on the "merits of the objective of the Hatch Act,"M the
78 Rule 128 of the Fire Department, City of Hoboken, provides "No member
shall take an active part in politics or political contests or engage in controversy
concerning candidates or issues." Id. at 684.
79 Id. at 688. Other cases employing this type of reasoning in determining
the constitutionality of similar restrictions include Huerta v. Flood, 447 P.2d 866
(Ariz. 1968); and Ivancie v. Thornton, 438 P.2d 612 (Ore. 1968).
80346 F. Supp. 578 (D.D.C. 1972).
81 The three-judge panel, a so-celd "constitutional court," was convened
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282, 2284 (1970).
82 Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 P.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971), see text accompanying
note 55 supra; and Mancuso v. Taft, 341 F. Supp. 574 (D.R.I. 1972), see text
accompanying note 59 supra. Here the court declared the Act unconstitutional
and enjoined its enforcement, but stayed the order pending determination by the
Supreme Court.
83 846 F. Supp. 578, 585 (D.D.C. 1972).
84 Id. at 580.
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Mitchell court specifically left unresolved the issue of the "manner in
which Congress defined the conduct it purported to prohibit."85 Con-
sidering the definition in 5 United States Code § 7324(a)86 measured
by first amendment standards, Judge Gesell found the definition "ambi-
guous and unsatisfactory."87 He noted that the definition incorporates
by reference over 3,000 rulings made by the Civil Service Commission
between 1886 and 1940, and these rulings, which were not before the
Congress when enacted, are overbroad; they have a ". . . sweep and
indefiniteness that no one would even attempt in these days to defend
if analyzed against the strictures of the First Amendment."88 But
overbreadth is not the statutory definition's only infirmity, it suffers
from vagueness as well. Judge Gesell indicated that "[p]rohibitions
are worded in generalities that lack precision. There is no standard.
No one can read the Act and ascertain what it prohibits."8 9 Thus
doubly-yoked with impermissible limitations, the Hatch Act in its
application has a "chilling effect" on the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights, and is thus unacceptable when measured against
constitutional guarantees.
The opinion recognized the need for some restriction on partisan
political activity by federal employees, but insisted that
•.. Congress may not by reason of this desirable objective neutral-
ize such a large segment of the populace from expressing any
opinion on any "political" issue with the intent of somehow in-
fluencing someone else. In the end, everything may appear political,
all speech may intend to influence, and conformity is imposed in the
fashion of more regimented, less democratic governments.90
Significantly, all the basic questions, i.e., rational relationship, com-
pelling interest, least restrictive means, and overbreadth and vagueness,
involved in a decision of this nature, are considered. Judge Gesell con-
cluded that although the aim of the Act may be legitimate and even
laudable, it cannot stand if in its application it infringes impermissibly
on protected constitutional rights.
Dissenting Judge MacKinnon signified his belief that the definition
in question has been rendered flexible and sufficiently lucid by sub-
sequent administrative and judicial interpretation, 91 and is therefore
85 Id., citing United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), where
Mr. Justice Reed speaking for the majority said, "We need to examine no further
at this time into the validity of the definition of political activity. 330 U.S.
at 103-04 (footnote omitted).
86 See text accompanying note 8 supra.
87 346 F. Supp. at 580.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 582.90 Id. at 583-84.
91 Id. at 592 (MacKinnon, I., dissenting).
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neither overbroad nor vague. It is important to note, however, that
although the dissent mechanically maintains that the issues in this
case were decided by Mitchell,92 it does not blindly follow Mitchelrs
limited facts-of-the-case view, but considers the scope of the Act as
applied in light of the first amendment doctrines of overbreadth and
vagueness. 93 That is to say that the dissent used the same analytical
tools as the majority although reaching a contrary result. In doing
so, Judge MacKinnon tacitly conceded the point that Congress' power
to restrict political activity of federal employees is limited by tradi-
tional first amendment doctrine. The disagreement is over exactly
where the limits are located. If his contention that Mitchell considered
the Hatch Act with a similar analysis is correct, then federal courts
have been misinterpreting Mitchell for twenty-five years.
The case is noteworthy, then, for more than one reason. First, it is
the only time that a federal court has declared the Hatch Act uncon-
stitutional. Second, and perhaps more important, it represents a
radical departure from the traditional federal analytical viewpoint of
this type of case. It appears that at last the Supreme Court will have
an opportunity to directly pass on the validity of the Hatch Act in
light of subsequent decisions regarding first amendment rights. Gov-
ernment employees have been political neuters long enough. Now
is the time for the Court to abandon the outdated doctrine of Mitchell
and consequently the sweeping strictures of the Hatch Act, by uphold-
ing the decision in this case.
ADDENDUM
The Supreme Court in a 6-8 decision handed down on June 25,
1973, reversed the holding of the District Court in an opinion which is
remarkable for its labored attempt to accommodate the Hatch Act
within the boundaries of the Constitution.94 In the majority opinion,
Mr. Justice 'White expresses the view, with which there is practically
unanimous agreement, that a need does exist for some governmental
control of the "political activity" of its employees, and that Congress
has the power to enact such regulations9 5 The implicit assumption
is that whatever restrictions Congress places on such activity must
be within the scope of the Constitution, as indeed all legislation must.
The opinion, although adhering to Mitchell in spirit, eschews Mitchelrs
921d. at 587.
931d. at 589-99.94 United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-
CIO, 41 U.S.L.W. 5122 (U.S. June 25, 1973).
95 Id. at 5124.
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narrow approach and considers the scope of the Act as a whole in
regard to constitutional limitations.
The Court, however, virtually ignores the pellucid reasoning of the
lower court in its attempt to uphold the statute, and adopts, without
expressly saying so, dissenting Judge MacKinnon's view that subse-
quent interpretation has rendered the definition of "political activity"
satisfactorily clear so that "the ordinary person exercising ordinary
common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with [the pro-
hibitions] ."1 Indeed, Mr. Justice White analogizes the constructions
given the term "political activity" by the Civil Service Commission to
the development of the common law.97 Therefore, he reasons, the
gloss imposed on the Act by these rulings clearly indicates precisely
what is prohibited, and thus precludes constitutional challenge be-
cause of vagueness and overbreadth.98
Nowhere in the opinion does the Court consider the other relevant
arguments posited against the Hatch Act, viz., rational relationship,
compelling governmental interest, or least restrictive means. Specific
constitutional interdictions must be evaluated in light of all relevant
doctrines, and this the Court has failed to do. Again, the dissent takes
the more reasonable approach. Mr. Justice Douglas acknowledges
that some restriction is necessary, but concludes that "[t]he present
Act cannot be appropriately narrowed to meet the need for narrowly
drawn language not embracing First Amendment speech or writing,
without substantial revision."99 What is needed, then, is a "new
start" by Congress on the problem. Unfortunately, the Court's de-
cision will do little to compel Congressional reevaluation.
James T. Gilbert
96 Id. at 5131.
97 Id. at 5125.
98 Id. at 5130.
99 Id. at 5137 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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